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Climate philosophers conceptualize ‘grandfathering’ as ‘emissions grandfathering’: past emis-
sion levels entitle to future emissions. With the notable but controversial exception of libertari-
an Luc Bovens (2011), they regard grandfathering as intrinsically, even if not instrumentally, un-
just. Questioning both the standard dismissal and Bovens’s Lockean pro-argument, this article 
defends the intrinsic (albeit limited) fairness of grandfathering conceptualized as ‘resources 
grandfathering’: fossil resource creation entitles to future resources use. A threefold ‘social con-
structivist’ ethical argument for this position is developed. First, philosophers’ basic aversion to 
grandfathering, while consistent with their emissions-based understanding, rests on an unde-
fended, shallow ‘cosmopolitan materialism’. Second, Bovens’s Lockean defense of the intrinsic 
fairness of grandfathering emission rights falls short for assuming a dubious ‘first-come first-
served’ within a retained cosmopolitan materialism, although it sensibly suggests to include re-
spect for investments in our understanding of grandfathering. Third, a ‘communitarian idealist’ 
defense of grandfathering, which stresses that ‘natural resources’ are cultural-historical crea-
tions, succeeds by undermining cosmopolitan materialism and eliminating first-come first-
served. Thus, grandfathering supports Western countries and opposes (possibly) non-Western 
small rich or rapidly industrializing ones, and implies a critique of the view that the West owes 
a massive climate debt to developing countries. Yet, grandfathering, as distributional starting-
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INTRODUCTION 
The politically most practiced but philosophically most opposed principle for 
allocating emissions space is arguably ‘grandfathering’. Climate philosophers gen-
erally understand this principle as one that distributes emission permits among 
states according to their current emission levels, so that the more a state emits in 
the start year, the more permits it receives for the future (Mi et al. 2019: 312; 
752  MENNO R. KAMMINGA 
 
 
Moellendorf 2015: 177; Page 2013: 233). As such, grandfathering is highly con-
troversial: it benefits developed, rich countries, whereas poor, developing coun-
tries would benefit by a seemingly more just principle that accounts for ‘historical 
responsibility’ for climate change (Mi et al. 2019: 317). During two decades of in-
ternational climate negotiations, developing countries have basically defended an 
‘equal per capita emissions’ standard and rejected grandfathering - or ‘equal per-
centage emissions reductions’ - as proposed by developed countries as wholly un-
fair (Damon et al. 2019: 34-37; cf. Torpman 2019: 6). In this, developing coun-
tries have received support, even if qualifiedly so, from climate activists and phi-
losophers: since past emissions have caused climate change, it would be counterin-
tuitive, if not perverse, to reward polluters who should actually pay (Damon et al. 
2019: 29). Thus, Darrel Moellendorf holds that grandfathering troublingly ‘[en-
trenches] an entitlement to high emissions to historically high emitters simply be-
cause they are historically high emitters’ (2015: 177); and Simon Caney concludes 
that ‘[n]o moral and political philosopher (to my knowledge) defends grandfather-
ing, presumably assuming that it is unjust’ (2009: 128; cf. Breakly 2015: 158). In-
deed, seen from an often (roughly) accepted ‘equal per-capita share’ perspective 
(cf. Torpman 2019: 2), one would expect the US and other Western states to ac-
cept a status as ‘debtors’ and transfer many trillions of dollars of climate reparation 
payments to developing countries as ‘creditors’ (Matthews 2016). 
Yet several ethical defenses of ‘emissions grandfathering’ have emerged. Prob-
ably the best known is the Lockean libertarian account of Luc Bovens (2011). Ac-
cording to Bovens, states have a future use right in their historically productive use 
of the atmospheric absorptive capacity as a good initially unproductively owned by 
all humanity. Largely in response to Bovens’s attempt to defend grandfathering on 
such intrinsic grounds, Carl Knight (2013, 2014) and Rudolf Schuessler (2017) 
have argued that grandfathering can be defensible but on instrumental grounds 
only, that is, if derived from basic ethical theories such as utilitarianism, egalitarian-
ism, and luck-based ethics. In being ‘moderate’, a defensible grandfathering 
(Knight 2013: 411-412) does not reward the polluters (cf. Caney 2009: 127). As 
Knight puts it, ‘that pumping out carbon should, intrinsically and regardless of its 
effects, increase entitlements would be a reductio of [libertarianism]. Emissions 
just do not seem intrinsically entitlement-granting’ (2013: 416, emphases in origi-
nal; cf. Moellendorf 2015: 177). If, then, Knight and Schuessler are right in reject-
ing Bovens’s view, we would still lack reason for thinking that grandfathering could 
be intrinsically legitimate and so should basically maintain Caney’s dismissal. 
This article criticizes the usual rejection of grandfathering as intrinsically unjust 
while attempting to improve upon Bovens’s Lockean pro-argument. Thus, I de-
fend the intrinsic (even if limited) fairness of grandfathering conceptualized as (for 
lack of a better term) ‘resources grandfathering’: fossil resource creation entitles to 
future resources use. I will develop a threefold ‘social constructivist’ ethical argu-




ment for my position. First, philosophers’ basic aversion to grandfathering, while 
in line with their emissions-based understanding, rests on an undefended, shallow 
‘cosmopolitan materialism’, according to which atmospheric absorptive capacity 
and fossil resources are ‘ecosystem services’ to be treated as common global goods 
(cf. Torpman 2019: 1). Second, Bovens’s defense of the intrinsic fairness of 
grandfathering emission rights falls short for assuming a dubious ‘first-come first-
served’ (cf. Shue 2015: 19; Damon et al. 2019: 23) within a retained cosmopolitan 
materialism, although it sensibly suggests to include respect for investments in our 
conception of grandfathering. Third, a ‘communitarian idealist’ defense of grand-
fathering, which highlights that ‘natural resources’ are cultural-historical creations, 
succeeds by undermining cosmopolitan materialism and making first-come first-
served non-existent. Thus, grandfathering supports Western countries and oppos-
es (possibly) non-Western small rich or rapidly industrializing ones, and implies a 
critique of the view that the West owes a huge climate debt (e.g., Matthews 2016) 
to poor countries. Yet, grandfathering, as distributional starting-point within a plu-
ralist climate ethical framework, should arguably be complemented by principles 
of ‘no-harm’ and ‘ability to pay’.1  
Before developing my arguments, I should clarify the difference between (the 
already mentioned terms of) ‘materialism’ and ‘idealism’ as ontological positions 
regarding ‘society’ (Wendt 1999). As Alexander Wendt (1999: 23) explains, ‘ma-
terialism’ holds that the key social fact is the impact of material forces; often, hu-
man nature, natural resources, geography, forces of production, and forces of de-
struction are seen as belonging to this category. By contrast, ‘idealism’ holds that 
the key social fact is the impact of social consciousness, that is, the constitutive ef-
fects of ideas or knowledge (Wendt 1999: 24). I shall, then, in line with Wendt’s 
‘social constructivism’ (albeit against his materialist view in this respect; Wendt 
1999: 23, 111), defend an idealist view of ‘natural resources’ as especially ‘idea-
tional’ and only ‘material’ in a minimal sense. Thus, I will make a communitarian-
idealist ethical case for grandfathering based on the ‘cultural history’ behind fossil 
fuels and atmospheric absorptive capacity. 
A CRITIQUE OF THE STANDARD PHILOSOPHICAL REJECTION 
My first argument is that philosophers’ basic dislike of grandfathering, while 
that fits their emissions-based conception, presupposes a narrow, questionable 
‘cosmopolitan materialism’. I shall focus on directly relevant arguments of Edward 
Page, Caney, Knight, and Schuessler. 
 
1 Seeking a moral foundation for grandfathering in the context of climate justice, I will not cover 
possible practical implications such as the advantage of bringing stakeholders together or the disad-
vantage of undermining incentives to invest in abatement or new technology (Damon et al. 2019; cf. 
Caney 2009: 128-130). 
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According to Page, emissions grandfathering is clearly unfair. As he writes: 
[T]he obvious problem with emissions grandfathering…is that it assigns an implau-
sible weight to the normative relevance of historic usage of the capacity of the at-
mosphere to assimilate greenhouse gas. [Thus,] anchoring the emissions entitle-
ments of states to their past emissions profiles would be unfair to states responsible 
for modest accumulations of atmospheric greenhouse gas since 1750 (Page 2013: 
233). 
One undesirable consequence, Page fears, is that ‘the per capita emissions of 
the developed world’ will continue ‘to exceed those of the developing world for 
many decades’ (2013: 233). 
However, in reaction to Page, while emissions in dangerously high levels do 
form an ‘obvious problem’, we need not conclude that grandfathering as a princi-
ple is obviously problematic. Indeed, Page’s negative judgement tacitly presuppos-
es that emissions and atmospheric absorptive capacity are simply material and 
should be globally shared so as to halt the historically unequal distribution of per 
capita emissions. Remarkably, Page thus also assumes the positive, wealth-related 
quality of ‘emissions’ as such. But this begs the question of what has made such 
beneficial emitting actually possible. 
Caney (2009) finds grandfathering - ‘that the fair share of emissions for any ac-
tor should be a function of its past share of emissions’ (127) - perverse. He raises 
two objections: 
First, it is insensitive to people’s needs and would lock members of developing 
countries into a permanent state of poverty and underdevelop-
ment…And…eradicating great poverty is an ethical concern of paramount im-
portance.…Grandfathering would entail that both China and India receive radically 
fewer emission rights per capita than North American, Japanese and European citi-
zens, and as such would thwart the former’s legitimate interests in development and 
the realization of fundamental human rights to meet basic needs. Second, grandfa-
thering runs contrary to another deeply held principle of justice - namely,…historical 
responsibility. It is widely held that those responsible for creating an environmental 
problem should bear a commensurate cost…Grandfathering, howev-
er,…remunerates people for behavior that has caused the problem (Caney 2009: 
128). 
Now, Caney’s ‘strong’ (Knight 2013; cf. Damon et al. 2019: 26) verdict, notably 
his second objection of historical responsibility, is conceivable as regards ‘emis-
sions grandfathering’, but it is also silently dependent on assumptions entailing the 
essential materiality and global-ness of emissions and atmospheric absorptive ca-
pacity: these provide his benchmarks for why polluters as causers of this ‘envi-
ronmental problem’ should pay. Note also that Caney, like Page, tacitly concedes 
the inherently positive, development-creating potential of fossil fuel-based ‘emis-
sions’ by itself; he even claims that developing countries are entitled to a particular 
share due to their legitimate anti-poverty development needs (his first objection). 




But again, we are not told how the very possibility to emit so valuably has come in-
to being in the first place. Finally, as Caney’s first objection of the global poor’s 
needs merely points to emission limits for the rich, it might be combined with pro 
tanto grandfathering and a plea for pluralism into a ‘moderate’ position - to be dis-
cussed now. 
Knight (2013, 2014), who argues that a ‘moderate’ grandfathering may be mor-
ally legitimate, maintains that grandfathering cannot be intrinsically fair. ‘Emissions 
grandfathering maintains that prior emissions increase future entitlements’, Knight 
(2013: 410) accepts. What he defends, then, is a grandfathering that (i) holds that 
one’s past emissions provide a pro tanto entitlement to one’s future emissions and 
so allows other considerations (e.g., basic needs, ability to pay) to influence emis-
sion entitlements, and (ii) is justified on instrumental grounds. Knight’s primary 
justification is utilitarian: in terms of welfare, since high emitters would probably 
benefit more than low emitters from each extra available unit of emission entitle-
ments, they receive more entitlements. Grandfathering so construed is probably 
temporary but not necessarily so depending on the factual balance of positive and 
negative outcomes (Knight 2013). Knight (2014) adds that members of countries 
with higher past emissions will face higher costs when transitioning to some lower 
emissions level; he then argues extensively that, from the perspectives of utilitari-
anism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism, they are therefore 
instrumentally entitled to greater emission entitlements than those with lower 
emissions. Knight (2014: 572-573) explicitly acknowledges that he, like most cli-
mate philosophers, assumes a broadly cosmopolitan account, treating the alloca-
tion of emission entitlements as a matter of distributive justice which ultimately de-
rives from individuals’ equal moral standing. 
Now, Knight’s claim that an agent’s earlier emissions offer a pro tanto reason 
for future emissions and so enable other important moral considerations to influ-
ence emission entitlements is well-taken. Indeed, a moderate defense of grandfa-
thering need not depend on it trumping all other concerns, but may well be at 
home within some pluralist framework. Yet, his instrumental justification (the suc-
cess of which I need not examine) notwithstanding, Knight tacitly assumes the ba-
sically material character of all emissions and does not bother to defend the cos-
mopolitanism according to which, he thinks, entitlements should be fairly distrib-
uted. Again, the question is why, if at all, these beliefs should be accepted. 
Schuessler (2017) offers a non-intrinsic, ‘luck-based’ argument for grandfather-
ing: the undeserved adverse shocks agents are subjected to should be communally 
‘buffered’. Since agents should have time to adapt to a situation that might other-
wise cause severe suffering and unsettle their lives, the non-permanent grandfa-
thering he defends permits people in industrial countries to reduce emissions 
gradually. As Schuessler explains: 
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Awareness of anthropogenic global warming [around 1990] entailed a responsibil-
ity to reduce GHG output considerably, and given the potential or even expectable 
negative welfare effects of such reductions, learning about global warming at a time 
when advanced economies already heavily depended on fossil fuel is to be regarded 
as a stroke of brute bad luck (Schuessler 2017: 151). 
Schuessler, then, defends ‘buffering’ as a luck-based transitory principle of jus-
tice, although he does assume global sufficientarianism about entitlement to basic 
resources and opportunities. He thus offers a principle of gradual adjustment in 
support of grandfathering, one that provides an appropriate amount of time to 
adapt to greener lifestyles and avoid severe unwarranted losses, without requiring 
the economy and habits to change abruptly yet expecting the need for buffering to 
become lesser over time (Schuessler 2017: 152, 158, 162). 
Like Knight, Schuessler appears plausibly committed to a bounded defense of 
grandfathering (of which, again, I need not discuss its non-intrinsic success) within 
a pluralist (here sufficientarianism-including) setting. Yet, again, we encounter an 
undefended basic commitment to cosmopolitanism and an account of emissions 
as self-evidently material, without any investigation of the origins of fossil fuel-
based emission as a phenomenon. 
In sum, philosophical critics and instrumentalist defenders of (moderate) 
‘emissions grandfathering’ wish to avoid the suggestion that grandfathering could 
have intrinsic legitimacy as a principle of climate justice. However, it is their mostly 
implicit, superficially cosmopolitan-materialist perspective that could make it too 
easy for them to reject grandfathering basically. For all their differences, the above 
critics of ‘intrinsic’ grandfathering uncritically share a framework of materialism 
and cosmopolitanism, and a maximal or minimal, weak or strong, egalitarianism.2 
Accordingly, their view of natural resources is rather static, which will make ‘in-
trinsic’ grandfathering quickly appear an unfair legitimization of a first-come first-
served use of natural resources such as fossil fuels and atmospheric absorptive ca-
pacity. Given the silent acceptance of ‘cosmopolitan materialism’, this framework 
might be vulnerable to non-egalitarian attacks that (successfully) defend ‘idealism’ 
and ‘communitarianism’. But perhaps an intrinsic defense of grandfathering on 
cosmopolitan materialist terms, to be examined in the next section, could also 




2 My criticism applies to not only ‘isolationists’ but also ‘integrationists’. The former see emis-
sions egalitarianism as a fair principle for one specific climate issue (the distribution of the available 
carbon budget); the latter (notably Caney) treat egalitarianism as comprehensively including emis-
sions, other burdens of climate change, and other justice concerns (Torpman 2019: 3). Yet both 
camps tend to uncritically accept cosmopolitan materialism. 




BOVENS’S LOCKEAN DEFENSE AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
Second, I argue that Bovens’s defense of the intrinsic fairness of grandfathering 
emission rights falls short for assuming a dubious first-come first-served within a 
retained cosmopolitan materialism, even though it sensibly suggests to include re-
spect for investments in our understanding of grandfathering. Bovens aims to offer 
‘a sustained, yet qualified, moral argument in support of grandfathering emission 
rights on Lockean grounds’ (2011: 126), which entails that none of the empirical 
differences between the atmosphere and the pastures precludes transposing grand-
fathering from the latter to the former (Godard 2017: 139). 
John Locke examined the legitimate appropriation of natural resources, nota-
bly land, in a pre-political state of nature. Like today’s cosmopolitans, he postulat-
ed initial common ownership of resources subsequently exposed to private ap-
propriation. In this state of nature, persons are free and equal, all possessing rights 
and duties regarding life, freedom, and ownership. Now, for Locke, (land) appro-
priation is legitimate if human labor changes the resource from common good to 
private good, no waste results, and ‘enough-and-as-good’ remains for the others 
(Godard 2017: 140-142). Bovens (2011: 128), then, postulates an unmanaged and 
unproductive commons and extends Locke’s argument for land allocation to allo-
cation of atmospheric absorptive capacity. 
According to Bovens, before industrialization, until 1800, the atmosphere was a 
rather unproductive commons, although it allowed breathing. It could absorb a 
certain amount of GHGs without problems, but there was no technology emitting 
worrisome amounts of ‘GHGs as by-products’ (Bovens 2011: 129). Then, due to 
technological progress, entrepreneurs started using portions of this atmospheric 
absorptive capacity. Initially, this happened without violating the enough-and-as-
good and no-waste conditions: many benefited, nobody was disadvantaged and all 
use was productive. Once the atmospheric absorption capacity, say, around 1960, 
appeared to be running out and overuse threatened to violate the enough-and-as-
good condition and initiate dangerous climate change, we closed the commons. 
Just as farming created claim rights over land, use of atmospheric absorption ca-
pacity created claim rights over atmospheric absorption capacity. Past use estab-
lishes differential claim rights to upcoming use of the atmospheric absorption ca-
pacity by emitting GHGs, according to Bovens (2011: 129, 140-141). His question 
now is: with atmospheric absorptive capacity appropriations having exceeded 
‘enough-and-as-good’, why would people having unequal emission rights based on 
their various use levels be unfair if we had accepted an allocation procedure that 
yielded unequal rights (Bovens 2011: 129)? His main answer is as follows: 
Developed countries should be able to demand that, in deliberations, some respect 
be paid to their appropriations of the atmospheric absorption capacity that predate 
the cutoff point at which the enough-and-as-good condition was first violated. When 
violations have been ongoing, this is not the sole principle, since we also need to 
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impose rectification on illicit appropriations past this cutoff point. And granted, 
these are for a large part due to growth in developed countries (but also to the 
GHG-intensive development of emerging economies). That some respect be paid to 
differential investments made during the time when there were no violations of the 
enough-and-as-good condition is common in such policy decisions. This, I take it, is 
the moral ground for grandfathering…emission rights (Bovens 2011: 134, emphasis 
in original). 
A radical, investment-disrespectful egalitarian reform of emissions rights, based 
on a sudden ‘equal rights’ idea, is as problematic as egalitarian land reforms with-
out respect for historically established rights, Bovens (2011: 135-136) insists. 
Bovens does soften his claim in view of existing great differences in emissions per 
capita. Humanitarian concerns such as a minimally decent standard of living 
should also count, although Lockean concerns or historical emission patterns 
should carry some weight (Bovens 2011: 136). Bovens foresees that ‘[m]y ap-
proach to GHG emission rights leads to a distribution of emission rights that will 
gradually become more and more egalitarian’, also by balancing ‘a concern for re-
specting differential investments’ with ‘a concern for rectification on grounds of 
the polluter-pays principle’ and with ‘egalitarian concerns and a concern to raise 
developing countries above the subsistence level’ (2011: 143, emphasis in origi-
nal). Thus, Bovens, too, eventually defends a broadly pluralist overall view that, as 
such, could have more plausibility. 
Now, Knight (2013: 415) thinks that Bovens’s libertarian justification fails es-
sentially. Although Bovens narrows the impact of the initial acquisition of emis-
sions rights, he does make it the starting-point. But, Knight insists, such rights be-
come untenable once we consider later generations, who, with nothing left to ac-
quire, are disenfranchised. Without a redistribution mechanism that could undo 
the initial acquisition effects, the end result will be that later people do not receive 
the same rights as those permitted to make the ‘first moves’. Hence Bovens’s lib-
ertarian approach ends up unattractive. Because, Knight adds, greenhouse gas 
emissions lack all moral appeal, Bovens’s extension of the libertarian justification 
to carbon emissions should make us question libertarianism: we cannot accept a 
view that entails that emissions, or ‘pumping out carbon’, should intrinsically in-
crease entitlements. 
Knight, I believe, overemphasizes ‘emissions’ in, and even makes a caricature 
of, Bovens’s position, which clearly does more than just defending ‘pumping out 
carbon’. Indeed, Bovens relates emissions rights, and thus grandfathering, to pro-
ductive natural resources use - notably of ‘atmospheric absorptive capacity’ as 
analogous to ‘land’ - rather than ‘emissions’ as actually ‘worrisome by-products’ 
(Bovens 2011: 129). What Bovens stresses is that we should pay ‘some respect to 
(differential) investments’ made. Yet, Knight’s ‘first moves’ concerns directly, and 
rightly, target Bovens’s effectively proposed ‘first-come first-served’ starting-rule for 
distributing scarce material resources as troubling from the latter’s own sensitivity 




to existing great differences in per capita emissions and fundamentally conflicting 
with the egalitarianism he also appears to endorse. Indeed, since Bovens (2011: 
142) accepts not only a Lockean cosmopolitanism but, surprisingly, also the rival 
egalitarian one, his attempt to reject the cosmopolitan critique of grandfathering 
looks quite questionable. 
Next, Schuessler (2017: 147-150) argues against Bovens that industrial coun-
tries have not legitimately appropriated a larger share of the atmosphere’s absorp-
tive capacity and cannot justifiably claim more extensive (Lockean) emission rights 
than others on a per capita basis, especially not by referring to the emission totals 
of 1990: the usual yet unstable reference point. As he further explains: 
The absorptive capacity for GHG is practically a non-renewable resource…Hence, 
the consumption of absorptive capacity is more or less analogues to the eating of a 
cake. Having eaten a fair share of the cake while others have just started nibbling at 
it does not entitle a fast eater to a larger piece of the cake, or to continued consump-
tion at an established proportional speed relative to others (Schuessler 2017: 149). 
Moreover, Schuessler argues, ‘[i]f countries are deprived of the opportunity to 
achieve economic growth, which under the prevailing technologies is coupled to 
greenhouse gas emissions’, it will be virtually impossible for them to engender wel-
fare for their citizens; and this does not just ‘mitigate Lockean grandfathering’ but 
‘strikes at its roots’ (2017: 149). Like Knight, then, Schuessler finds that ‘there is 
no reason to grant industrial countries higher emission rights…simply because they 
have a history of high emissions’ (2017: 150). 
Now, Schuessler, too, overstresses ‘emissions’ and neglects the role of ‘invest-
ments’ in Bovens’s account. Again, Bovens’s defense of grandfathering in favor of 
industrial countries entails more than ‘simply because they have a history of high 
emissions’ (Schuessler). Nevertheless, Schuessler’s ‘fast eater’ objection entails an 
appropriate critique of Bovens’s effectively proposed ‘first-come first-served’ start-
ing rule for atmospheric absorptive capacity distribution. After all, Bovens accepts 
egalitarianism in addition to his Lockean respect for investments and treats at-
mospheric absorptive capacity as ultimately materialist, and so indeed as ‘more or 
less analogous to the eating of a cake’ (Schuessler). 
In sum, Bovens’s intrinsic, (moderately) Lockean account, although not wholly 
implausible, cannot be decisive. Sharing the standard cosmopolitan materialist 
view of atmospheric absorptive capacity and even conceding the final force of egal-
itarianism, he ends up advocating an unsatisfactory ‘first-come first-served’. Thus, 
eventually weakening his Lockeanism for the sake of his critics’ other-regarding 
concerns, Bovens fails to refute philosophers’ tendency towards a more or less 
egalitarian distribution of resources and emissions. We should now either reject 
‘intrinsic’ grandfathering or, as I propose, seek a defense that transcends cosmo-
politan materialism and egalitarianism; a defense that enforces Bovens’s move to-
wards natural resources and investments - as still a partially satisfactory answer to 
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the question of where the very possibility to beneficially emit comes from - but al-
so nullifies problems such as the ‘cake eating’ one. 
A COMMUNITARIAN IDEALIST ETHICAL CASE: FROM COMMONS 
TO CULTURAL HISTORY 
My third argument is that a ‘communitarian idealist’ defense of grandfathering 
succeeds by undermining cosmopolitan materialism and making the problem of 
‘first-come first-served’ non-existent. We should move beyond Bovens’s Lockean 
view towards a communitarian one that stresses ‘natural resources’ being the result 
of idealist inventiveness and so cancels out ‘first-come first-served’ at this basic lev-
el. We should not think of resource use in terms of appropriation of a commonly 
owned and practically non-renewable resource and adopt Schuessler’s ‘cake eat-
ing’ analogy. As we shall see, there were no such resources before the Industrial 
Revolution as a unique socio-historical process, so that discovery and use come 
first, distribution only second. According to Knight, grandfathering means that 
past emissions enlarge rights to future emissions; yet, to suggest that there is no 
reason to grant industrial countries higher emission rights permanently simply be-
cause they have a history of high emissions, while correct as such, is to misstate the 
issue. As will become clearer, not all emissions should count equally. Moving to 
communitarian idealism, then, will enable an effective defense of the intrinsic 
force of grandfathering. I use work of economic theologian Michael Novak and 
social scientist Olivier Godard in order to show the social construction of fossil 
fuels (Novak) and the atmosphere (Godard) as initially non-scarce resources.3 
My broadly anti-egalitarian, communitarian argument for grandfathering I take 
from Novak: modern (fossil) resources, without mass welfare just could not have 
been possible, are rooted in Western, notably Anglo-Saxon, cultural history. No-
vak ([1982] 1991: 305) first notes that no people, no matter how exploitative or 
imperialist, had been able to achieve a tenable economic development until the 
steam machine and Industrial Revolution were invented. Next, he explains how, 
through science, technology, and economic organization, England managed to do 
this in the first half of the nineteenth century: 
In 1850, Great Britain was just completing seventy straight years during which, with 
a dynamism never before matched in history, its gross national product grew every 
year by an average of nearly 2 percent a year. This seemingly miraculous achieve-
 
3 The discussion to follow draws on and builds on Kamminga (2019: 8-13, 36). Its argument nul-
lifies the debate about the extent to which the Lockean enough-and-as-good and no-waste condi-
tions (could) have been satisfied in the case of atmospheric absorptive capacity use since the Indus-
trial Revolution (Bovens 2011; Moellendorf 2011; Godard 2017: 143-145). After all, the point here 
is that, by invoking communitarian idealism as a more fundamental perspective, we need not be 
concerned with such conditions. 




ment introduced into the world the reality of economic development…The law of 
patents had greatly stimulated invention, as had the Royal Society. In every decade 
and in almost every year, new technologies excited the populace (Novak [1982] 
1991: 301). 
Regarding America, Novak explains how much the fact that the US population 
uses much more energy that the world average proportionally has been interpret-
ed wrongly: 
[It has been stated that] 40 percent of the world’s energy is used by 6 percent of the 
world’s population residing in the United States. This way of putting the facts [ex-
emplifies a] cultivation of guilt…What the entire human race meant by energy until 
the discovery of the United States and the inventions promoted by its political econ-
omy were the natural forces of sun, wind, moving water, animals, and human mus-
cle…In 1809 an American outside Philadelphia figured out how to ignite anthracite 
coal. The ability to use anthracite…made practical the seagoing steamship and the 
locomotive. In 1859 the first oil well was dug outside of Titusville, Pennsylva-
nia…Arabia would have been as rich then as now, if anybody had known what to do 
with the black stuff. The invention of the piston engine and the discovery of how to 
drill for oil were also achieved in the United States. The first electric light bulb was 
illuminated in 1879 in Edison, New Jersey. After World War II the U.S. govern-
ment dragooned the utilities into experimenting with nuclear energy…[promoting] 
the peaceful uses of the atom. Thus 100 percent of what the modern world means 
by energy was invented by 6 percent of the world’s population. More than 60 per-
cent of that energy had been distributed to the rest of the world. Though the United 
States can, of course, do better than that, we need not feel guilty for inventing forms 
of energy [so] useful to the human race (Novak [1981] 1995: 777; cf. [1982] 1991: 
300; 2008; 2014). 
Now Novak tends to exaggerate the US contribution in comparison with the 
European one. Yet it is clear that about 100 percent of modern energy is of West-
ern, largely American, origin.4 Novak, then, offers no cosmopolitan or (purely) 
libertarian view but a communitarian one: by nature, humans are social beings, or 
‘communitarian individuals’ (Novak [1982] 1991: 143-155), who can be inventors 
only within a social-cultural and institutional context of inventiveness and industri-
ousness. Thus, beneath Bovens’s materialism we find more than resource-based 
‘investments’. The ideational factor of cultural historical achievement, without 
which fossil resources would not have come into existence, is what makes the dif-
ference. 
 
4 Novak enumerates: ‘electricity, the Franklin stove, the steam engine, the piston engine pro-
pelled by gasoline (and now by electric and/or hydrogen batteries), the processing of crude oil into 
gasoline, nuclear energy, the jet engine, the development of ethanol and other fuels derived from 
plants, and other devices - all of these except one [the British-invented steam engine] were invented 
by the people of the United States, as their gift to the world’ (2008). Yet, although the US have con-
stantly made technological and commercial-optimizing contributions, underlying these are often also 
originally European inventions (engines, batteries, nuclear energy). 
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Accordingly, Novak plausibly argues that, since for resources ‘culture’ is the key 
factor, ‘equality’ is irrelevant (cf. Kamminga 2008: 679). He quotes Brazilian Ro-
man-Catholic archbishop Dom Helder Camara, who stated in 1970: ‘It is a sad 
fact that 80 percent of the world’s resources are at the disposal of 20 percent of 
the world’s inhabitants’ (Novak [1982] 1991: 299; cf. 2008). This, Novak holds, il-
lustrates a false use of the term ‘resources’. Such a ‘sad fact’ is only so from a par-
ticular ideological-moral perspective; but behind this (partially true5) fact lie ‘quite 
diverse cultural histories’ (Novak [1982] 1991: 299). Novak recalls only how short 
ago entire humanity had no clue of the potential of oil. Most ‘materials’ we now 
call ‘resources’ were not regarded as such before the development of a democratic 
capitalist political economy, but remained ‘dumb’, ‘inert’. The meaning of ‘re-
sources’ includes the ideational factor of culture, as expressed by discovery and 
invention; the ‘Protestant European culture’ of ‘proliferation with talents’ has been 
particularly fertile in this respect. Thus, archbishop Camara could have noted: ‘It 
is a marvelous fact that [80-90] percent…of the world’s resources have been dis-
covered and put to use during the past century by one of the smaller cul-
tures…The benefits of such discoveries have been carried to every continent’ (No-
vak [1982] 1991: 300). In so openly deploring inegalitarianism, Camara ignored 
that some cultures have arranged their political economy for the goal of discover-
ing resources and inventing useful technologies, while others have not. His own 
Brazil could itself have created technologies for utilizing (its) resources, Novak 
([1982] 1991: 300) states. 
This unique, anti-equality view of the ‘conservative’ Novak, while ignored by 
cosmopolitans (Godard 2017: 74-78; cf. Knight 2014: 589) in particular, finds 
support in the work of familiar, ‘progressive’ yet (roughly) communitarian, philos-
ophers. Thus, David Miller (1999) stresses that the value of a resource depends 
on the talents, knowledge, and technological skills needed for using it fruitfully. 
Until recently, uranium-rich rock was useless instead of the valuable resource it 
has become today; no one knew how to extract and exploit it. A low-developed 
country with uranium depots does not simply own a valuable resource if it does 
not also possess the technology for mining and using uranium. It will need an out-
side (Western) mining company to extract the uranium, and without extraction the 
value of the resource stays undetermined. Whether, then, the citizens of this (or 
any other) country possess something like their ‘equal share’ cannot be estab-
lished, Miller (1999: 193) concludes. John Rawls, philosophical defender of egali-
tarianism within liberal societies, holds that ‘the causes of the wealth of a peo-
ple…lie in their political culture and [their] religious, philosophical, and moral tra-
 
5 Fossil energy exporting countries are mostly non-Western rather than Western. Thus, the 
OPEC countries are the ones who possess most of the oil and control the supply and price thereof. 
Indeed, the West is often a net-payer itself, without having full command of the benefits of its own 
inventiveness in this regard. 




ditions…, as well as in [their] industriousness…cooperative talents…and…capacity 
for innovation’ (1999: 108). This, Rawls (1999: 117) argues, makes discussions 
about a more or less equal transnational distribution of natural resources otiose. 
All this being so, the dominant cosmopolitan, (roughly) egalitarian view over-
looks the ‘cultural’ point by frequently, but mistakenly, presupposing that 
‘[r]esources are found “out there,”…under one’s feet’; it thus misleadingly infers 
that ‘the natural distribution of resources is a [relatively pure] case of something 
being “arbitrary from a moral point of view”’, and that ‘each person has an equal 
prima facie claim to a share of the total available resources’ (to quote Beitz [1979] 
1999: 139-141). I disagree, then, with Megan Blomfield (2019), who assumes, in 
cosmopolitan materialist vein, that natural resources, which are of fundamental 
value to everybody, exist independently of human beings, and who argues that 
natural resources are appropriate objects of egalitarian justice: all human beings 
have an equal original claim to them (even if not a right to an equal share), she in-
sists. But (modern) ‘natural resources’ are not human-independent; and people’s 
rights to basic needs fulfillment (Blomfield 2019) should be treated as a separate 
issue (involving, e.g., foreign aid or population restriction) and not as simply 
linked to natural resources entitlement. 
Still, one could object that, historically, more has happened than ‘Western in-
venting’. The Islamic world influenced medieval European culture in many ways: 
philosophically, scientifically, mathematically, and technologically. Various fea-
tures of modern technology are the product of various cultures in mutual interac-
tion. Oil was already in use in the Middle East, before Western entrepreneurs 
recreated and utilized it for modern purposes. However, first, all of this does not 
affect the decisiveness of the Western-cultural contribution of constructing re-
sources for industrial welfare development. Oil was actually used in earlier (bibli-
cal) times for products such as perfume and ink (Novak [1981] 1995: 777), or as 
lubricant, for instance. Yet it were the inventions of the combustion engine and oil 
drilling technology that could unlock oil’s full potential and turn it into the im-
portant modern - and subsequently widely desired - energy source with which the 
West, in line with the English-European Industrial Revolution, lay the foundation 
for the creation of society-wide prosperity.6 And second, in conceding the role of 
‘culture’, such an objection could only - but again, not really - compel us to draw 
the circle somewhat wider. In the absence of sustained intercultural influencing 
globally, it could also not entail a convincing defense of an equal per capita (or 
some other cosmopolitan) emission norm. 
 
6 In the Middle East, the first oil strike took place only in 1908, with Western companies provid-
ing the technology and knowledge Middle Eastern countries themselves lacked. See the clear oil his-
tory timeline in BBC, ‘Black gold: how did oil come to run our world?’, 
https://www.bbc.com/timelines/zqgxtfr, last accessed 27 September 2019. 
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Next, as regards atmospheric absorptive capacity, the creation of this as a ‘re-
source’ has resulted from the creation of welfare and elimination of mass poverty 
through fossil fuels and technology as a Western-cultural invention actively based 
on resources as ideational constructions rather than passively as matter. As Go-
dard (2017: 107-108, 127, 140) explains, the atmosphere in 1990 was not a new 
manna to be shared among all world citizens without taking account of legitimate 
past uses and rights. There was no prior collective ownership. The West had not 
been using something that clearly belonged to everyone or anyone; rather, it ac-
tively, albeit unintentionally, created something that did not yet exist in a meaning-
ful way (against Torpman 2019: 5-6). To quote Godard’s non-generic, historical 
account: 
[It would be] a historical misinterpretation [to assume] that in moral terms the abil-
ity of the atmosphere to absorb GHGs has been a resource common to all human-
kind since the beginning of historical time…[T]his function of the atmosphere 
emerged only when human technology and economic activity transformed a natural 
condition into a useful resource. Moreover, it was [only] at the end of the twentieth 
century that it became a scarce resource due to the feared impacts of climate 
change. [Thus], considering that the absorption of GHGs was a common resource 
in 1850 is the result of a retrospective illusion. It is blind to the contingency of the 
historical conditions for the emergence of the climate threat: the recent evolution of 
GHG emissions since 1988…did not constitute a fatality or a fate that people in 
1920, for example, could and should reasonably have anticipated. Not only did 
people at that time have no knowledge of the phenomenon, but the phenomenon 
itself had not been historically shaped. It was still possible that future energy systems 
would be based on diversified sources of energy, and that human demography 
would not take [such a] galloping pace…: in 1920, the world population stood at just 
1.8 billion people. Futures without climate change were still possible…Historical 
conditions have made the absorption of GHGs the scarce resource that it was not 
initially (Godard 2017: 107-108). 
Regarding the atmosphere, Godard’s argument cuts deeper than a Lockean 
one, and has more force against cosmopolitan egalitarianism. In contrast to land, 
for the atmosphere the - less material but more ideational - point of departure is 
not an initial common ownership of terrestrial resources, but a socio-historical 
process of the construction of something new: ‘atmospheric absorptive capacity’. 
Whereas a Lockean starting-point - a commons unmanaged and unproductive 
(Bovens 2011: 128) - may have applied to land, the atmosphere, by contrast, was 
no commons apart from breathing as its core material element. Rivalry and non-
excludability as features of common pool resources (Bovens 2011: 130) became 
later and unforeseen concerns only. The atmosphere was owned by no one initial-
ly, in contrast to land usually (like American land being firstly owned by Indians). 
While people have usually wanted land for more direct reasons, atmospheric ab-
sorptive capacity is at best wanted more indirectly, insofar as cultures have created 
- industrial-economic - reasons for needing it. That industrialized countries had 




the benefit of early entrance (Bovens 2011: 141) is irrelevant: atmospheric absorp-
tive capacity did not really exist until the West generated industrialization. Thus, 
the current cosmopolitan belief that the atmosphere is humanity’s common prop-
erty to which everyone has the same indisputable right wrongly suggests that who-
ever invented atmospheric use is morally random. But the atmosphere is now be-
ing framed as the ‘common property of humankind’ to which all humans should 
have the same right, whether they belong to past, present or future generations. 
Thus, the idea - based on some norm of equal per capita distribution supposedly 
valid since the beginning of history - that some countries have made excessive his-
torical use of the atmosphere is false, even if the issue of possible damage caused 
to the environment of other countries by GHG emissions from a given country 
remains valid (Godard 2017: 80; Bovens 2011: 134, 143). Without the Western 
finding of fossil fuels, non-Western countries could never have had any reason for 
claiming something like the ‘atmospheric absorptive capacity’ to be equally divid-
ed globally.7 
In sum, cosmopolitan materialism should give way to (what could be called) 
‘resources grandfathering’. The West invented the Industrial Revolution and 
worked hard to generate fossil (and nuclear) energy, so that its millennia-long state 
of hunger and misery could eventually be replaced by mass welfare. As Schuessler 
admits, ‘the riches of industrialization did not come about as mere windfall profits 
or simply as a result of fossil fuel burning. It took much thought and effort to cre-
ate the wealth of nations’ (2017: 151 n. 16). It is, then, too simple to insist that 
countries and persons all have an obvious moral right to fossil fuel-based econom-
ic growth to the same extent as industrialized countries, and to assistance provision 
by those latter countries insofar as is needed for this purpose. From a communi-
tarian perspective, not all countries’ emissions should count equally as causes of 
‘pollution’; those done by inventor countries should weigh less and entitle more to 
grandfathering. Resources are not just material and for the picking-up; without 
Western Europe, particularly England (thus not India or China) with its Industrial 
Revolution as path towards sustained welfare (see Landes 1998), and the US, 
which with its talent, effort, and creativity as ultimate source of their later welfare 
transformed rough materials into ‘resources’, we might never have come to know 
 
7 My ‘second-line’ communitarian idealist argument would be that the extra emissions from the 
West are broadly compensated by what it has thereby produced specifically as life-enhancing goods 
to the benefit of non-Westerners also (cf. Bovens 2011: 132). Consider industrialization and eco-
nomic production, but also progress regarding science, technology, literature, communication, mu-
sic and instruments, medicine, health care, and food production. Admittedly, developing countries 
have often paid for benefits acquired from Western inventions. Yet these are often positive external-
ities for which Westerners have not been fully compensated (Posner and Sunstein 2008: 1594); and 
the value of the original creativity behind these findings as sine qua non cannot be morally wiped 
out - wholly reduced to commodities - by plain payment acts. It is, then, not unfair that the West has 
benefited first and most from a fossil fuel-based and atmosphere-utilizing economic process it has 
invented and developed itself. 
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their usefulness. Hence, while a ‘first-come first-served’ basis for distribution 
would be unfair, the popular idea that the West was ‘only the first’ is simply false. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that grandfathering, construed in terms of ‘resources’ rather than 
simply ‘emissions’, possesses intrinsic fairness for the purpose of combating cli-
mate change. Thus, grandfathering may play a major, lasting role in climate poli-
tics, namely by working selectively in favor of the West. Insofar as political climate 
practice has benefited the West, there is nothing particularly unjust about this, that 
is, as a starting-point. The real distributional problem does not lie with the US or 
Europe, despite them being large resource users and emitting entities, and having 
already used much atmospheric space in the past. As a baseline, they are entitled 
to grandfathering and thus to maintaining relatively (but not absolutely) high annu-
al permits for future emissions. Accordingly, not entitled to grandfathering are 
high-emitting non-Western countries such as China, India, and other industrializ-
ing countries, and high-emitting small rich countries such as Qatar, Curacao, Lat-
via, Bahrein, and United Arab Emirates. Note that, with distributive justice not be-
ing the whole of morality, there is one escape from this conclusion, albeit an unat-
tractive one: to argue that the Industrial Revolution was a wrong turn in human 
history - with sustained and widespread global poverty as the price to pay. Thus, 
the moral choice is either to accept grandfathering or to reject Industrial Revolu-
tion-based economic development and so the very right to emit altogether.8 
If we do accept the (relative) intrinsic moral justifiability of grandfathering as de-
fended in this article, we should not exempt Western countries from making very 
serious efforts in the fight against climate change. First: Bovens is right to reject ‘a 
regime in which…developed countries…are branded as scoundrels for every inch 
that they deviate from equal emission rights per capita, and in which they 
[owe]…developing countries…Versailles-style wartime reparations’ (2011: 144). 
Yet some climate debt does exist insofar as the West - like the non-Western coun-
tries mentioned above - has violated its community-transcending negative duty (as 
ethically more basic than positive duties to assist the needy) by, through its high 
emissions, having done excessive harm to those who suffer the most from climate 
change and have hardly contributed to the problem (Duus-Otterström and Jagers 
2012; cf. Pogge 2004: 278-279; Shue 2015: 17-18; Blomfield 2019: 225). This ‘re-
sidual debt’ would have to be paid off, that is, insofar as communities harmed will 
maintain a climate-friendly behavior by abstaining from fossil fuel use. Second, as 
 
8 For principal-ecological reasons, one could dismiss industrial welfare as means to combat pov-
erty and thereby consistently blame the ‘Western community’ as the key climate spoiler. However, 
the moral consequence of such a dismissal would also be to refrain from fossil fuel employment 
oneself as means for achieving welfare - for poor countries a position difficult to maintain. 




with power comes responsibility, the ‘good grandfather’ should accept climate re-
sponsibility as based on the positive duty of ‘ability to pay’ (Knight 2013), notably 
for funding the energy transition and climate adaptation worldwide. This way, 
then, we have arrived at a specific pluralist framework of climate justice: one that 
includes ‘no-harm’ and ‘ability to pay’ besides ‘grandfathering’. Thus, while some-
thing like ‘equal percentage emissions reductions’ by all emitting states as (techni-
cally) accepted by developed countries (as noted in the introduction) has moral 
force and is really urgent now, this pluralist framework also entails the special re-
sponsibility of rich, powerful countries to help make the 2015 Paris Climate 
Agreement a success by ensuring finance. 
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